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Abstract
This paper provides a detailed study of a simple life-cycle consumption
model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and an imperfect nancial market.
It gives a complete characterization of savings behaviors. The joint assump-
tions of quasi-hyperbolic discount factors and no-borrowing constraints may
lead to non-convexities in selves objective functions that may imply dis-
continuous equilibrium strategies. Savings function may undergo jumps and
non-monotonicities when the income or the interest rate reach a threshold
value. These "anomalies" may exist even for reasonable parameters values.
JEL classication: D03, D91
Keywords: quasi-hyperbolic preferences, no-borrowing constraint, discon-
tinuous strategies.
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1 Introduction
Laibson (1997) analyzes the decisions of a hyperbolic consumer who has ac-
cess to imperfect capital markets. He points out that some restrictions on
parameters (interest rate and labor income) are necessary to use marginal
conditions to characterize the equilibrium strategies. Otherwise, it is possi-
ble that selves face a "nonconvex reduced-form choice set" that may generate
discontinuous equilibrium strategies. Therefore, he restricts the set of para-
meters in order to eliminate this problem.
Some other studies have considered similar frameworks in which the same
properties of nonconvexity may occur (e. g. Laibson (1998), Harris and Laib-
son (2001)). But they do not focus on the occurrence of these discontinuous
strategies. Harris and Laibson (2002) provide the most detailed study of this
question. They give an intuition of such strategies. They present the results
of numerical simulations, using for labor income a random variable gener-
ated by a shift symmetric Beta density. The parameter  being the bias for
the present of the hyperbolic consumer (with   1), and  the relative risk
aversion parameter, they show that irregularities in the consumption function
tend to disappear when  is close to 1 and  is high enough. They conclude
that discontinuous strategies do not arise when the model is calibrated with
empirically sensible parameter values.
The aim of this paper is to challenge Harris and Laibsons conclusions,
in showing that discontinuous equilibrium strategies should not be neglected
too soon. Firstly, their conclusions were obtained by numerical simulations
with a particular law on labor-income. One aim of this paper is to go beyond
these simulation results, by a detailed study of consumption and savings
behavior in a simple framework that allows a complete characterization of
such strategies.
Secondly, Harris and Laibsons results are not very surprising. If  is close
to 1 or if  is high, the behavior with hyperbolic discounting is very close
to the behavior with exponential discounting. When hyperbolic discounting
does not matter, it is not surprising to nd that discontinuities vanish. On
the other hand, if hyperbolic discounting actually modies agentsbehaviors,
it is also associated with discontinuous equilibrium strategies. The value of
 may also depend on the time duration of the period, and therefore on the
frequency of agentsdecisions. If the time separating two decisions is long, it
can be pertinent to assume that  is low. In this case, hyperbolic discounting
should have a great e¤ect on behaviors. If the length of the period is short,
 should be close to 1 and hyperbolic discounting should have a low impact.
Thirdly, discontinuous equilibrium strategies can be interesting, as they
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provide an example of a behavior that qualitatively di¤ers from the standard
model. In the standard model with exponential discount factors, consump-
tion behaviors are continuous functions of the di¤erent parameters: interest
rates, labor incomes, etc. A consequence of hyperbolic discounting is that
a continuous change of one parameter can induce a jump in consumption
and savings. Therefore, the two models of consumption and savings lead to
results with qualitative di¤erences. They are not observationally equivalent.
This paper considers a simple framework to obtain a complete charac-
terization of solutions: a three-period quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of
life-cycle consumption. At each period the consumer earns some revenue.
She/he has access to a nancial market with a given interest rate on sav-
ings. The nancial market is imperfect in the sense that borrowing is not
possible. In periods 1 and 2; selves 1 and 2 strategically choose their amount
of savings. The paper studies the Nash equilibrium of this game in which
self 1 plays rst and knows the best response function of self 2: In the lit-
erature, this equilibrium is often named the "sophisticated solution". From
the assumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the discount factor between
period 2 and period 3 is higher for self 1 than for self 2: This discrepancy
in preferences may cause a non-concavity of the objective function of self 1;
when it is associated with the non-borrowing constraint. For some values
of incomes and interest rate, it is possible that self 20s decision to save or
not depends on the amount of savings chosen by self 1: At the limit value of
self 10s savings for which self 20s savings cancel out, the derivative of self 10s
objective undergoes a positive jump. This jump results from the discrepancy
between the preferences of the two selves. In this case, self 10s objective func-
tion may have two local maxima that must be compared to nd the Nash
equilibrium. When some parameter of income or interest rate changes, it
is possible that the best strategy of self 1 undergoes a jump from one local
maximum to the other one.
These results have important consequences on the properties of the result-
ing savings functions. Some examples are provided for which savings func-
tions can be non-monotonic and may undergo jumps. Initially, the bench-
mark calibration of Harris and Laibson (2002) is used. Considering rst
period savings with respect to rst and second period incomes, it is shown
that savings function may undergo a jump upward for some threshold value
of incomes. After the jump, there is a signicative change in the propensity
to save with respect to incomes. Harris and Laibsons calibration considers
an elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5 (a relative risk aversion parameter
equal to 2). Increasing the elasticity of substitution allows us to obtain higher
jumps in savings function, as the consumer has less taste for consumption
4
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smoothing.
Section 2 presents the model and gives the basic results in the case with-
out non-convexity problems. Section 3 studies the model when the non-
borrowing constraint and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting assumption create
non-convexity problems. Section 4 gives an overall picture of the results and
point out some consequences on savings functions. Section 5 concludes, and
Section 6 presents the technical Appendixes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
The model is simple, and is restricted to a three-period quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model. In period 1, self 1 preferences are given by the utility
function:
U(c; d; e) = u (c) + u (d) + 2u (e)
with
u(x) =
x1 
1

1  1

(1)
and  > 0: c; d and e are respectively the consumption levels in period 1, 2
and 3.
In period 2, self 2s preferences are given by the utility function:
u (d) + u (e)
The budget constraints are:
c+ x = A
d+ y = B +Rx
e = C +Ry
A; B and C are respectively the income amounts earned in period 1, 2 and
3. x and y are rst and second period savings. R is the factor of interest. 
and  are two positive coe¢ cients not greater than 1.  is the usual discount
parameter and  is the bias for the present.
Capital markets are imperfect: x  0 and y  0: These constraints mean
that the agent cannot be indebted1.
1It could also represent a more general setting. Assume that the constraints follow
5
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The discount factor between period 2 and period 3 is  if it is computed
by self 1, and  if it is computed by self 2. The parameter  indicates
whether there is a self-control problem ( < 1) or not ( = 1). x is the
decision variable of self 1 and y the decision variable of self 2. The sequence
of decisions of the agent results from the equilibrium of the game between
selves 1 and 2, in which self 1 plays rst. Therefore, self 2 chooses y; x
being taken as given. Self 1 chooses x; taking into account the best response
function of self 2.
2.2 Self 2s behavior
The program of self 2 is:(
max
(y)
u (B +Rx  y) + u (C +Ry)
s. t. y  0
The solution to this program can be interior (y > 0) or not. Dening the
threshold
~x  1
R

C
(R)
 B

(2)
the best response function of self 2 is:
Y (x) =
8<:
(R)(B+Rx) C
R+(R)
0
if x  ~x
if x  ~x
(3)
Y is a non-decreasing function of x:
In the case C  B (R) ; y is always non-negative, even if x = 0:
The optimal choice of y is not constrained by the constraint y  0: In the
opposite case C > B (R) ; it is possible that the optimal behavior without
the form: x   v and y   w: In this case, with the change of variables: x0  x + v;
y0  y + w; A0  A + v; B0  B + w   Rv; C  C 0   Rw; the budget constraints of the
consumer can be written again:
c+ x0 = A0
d+ y0 = B0 +Rx0
e = C 0 +Ry0
with the constraints: x0  0 and y0  0:
6
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the constraint y  0 leads to a negative optimal value for y: In this case the
constraint is binding and y = 0: As a consequence, the choice of x by self 1
can determine if self 2 is constrained or not.
2.3 The case C  B (R)
This case is simple to study as y is non-negative whatever the choice of x:
This is the situation that is considered in general in the literature on savings
with hyperbolic discounting.
The optimal behavior of self 1 is obtained in maximizing his objective
function, taking into account the best response function of self 2 (3):(
max
(x)
u (A  x) + u (B +Rx  Y (x)) + u (C +RY (x))
s. t. x  0
Replacing Y (x) by the equation (3), this program can be written after some
calculations:(
max
(x)
1
1  1
(A  x)1 1= + 1
1  1
Z
 
B +Rx+ C
R
1 1=
s. t. x  0
(4)
with
Z = 

1 +  (R) 1

[1 +R 1 ()]1 1=
(5)
The solution is:
 If RZA > B + C=R
x =
RZA B   C
R
R +RZ
 x^ (6)
 If RZA  B + C=R; x = 0:
Using the optimal value of x (either x^ given by (6) or 0), it is possible to
nd the equilibrium value of y given by Y (x) (cf. equation (3)).
7
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3 Resolution in the case C > B (R)
3.1 The non-concavity of self 1s objective function
The case C > B (R) is more interesting as it is possible that the optimal
choice of y is positive or 0; depending on the choice of x: The problem of the
non-concavity of the objective function of self 1 may occur. To see this, let
us consider the objective function of self 1, taking into account the optimal
response of self 2.(
max
(x)
u (A  x) + u (B +Rx  Y (x)) + 2u (C +RY (x))
s. t. x  0
Taking the derivative with respect to x of this objective function (with
x 6= ~x), we obtain:
u0(c) +Ru0(d) + Y 0(x) [ u0(d) +Ru0(e)] (7)
If the consumer had no problem of self control ( = 1), the expression
[ u0(d) +Ru0(e)] would correspond to the derivative of self 2s objective
function. This term cancels out ( u0(d) + Ru0(e) = 0) along the best
response function of self 2. This is a simple consequence of the envelope the-
orem. Therefore, the discontinuity of the derivative Y 0 in ~x is not a problem
and the derivative of self 1s objective function (7) is continuous.
In the case of a quasi-hyperbolic consumer ( < 1), there is a discrep-
ancy between the objective functions of self 1 and self 2. From the rst
order condition of self 2, it is obtained that  u0(d) + Ru0(e) = 0; which
implies  u0(d) + Ru0(e) > 0: Moreover, for x = ~x; the derivative Y 0(x) is
discontinuous: the derivative is 0 to the left of ~x; and is positive to the right.
The consequence of this analysis is that the derivative of self 1s objective
function is discontinuous at the point ~x; with a higher value to the right of ~x:
It is then possible that self 1s objective function admits two local maxima.
The function is concave on each interval (0; ~x) and (~x;+1) and continuous,
but the derivative is discontinuous in ~x:
When the objective function of self 1 has two local maxima, one on the
interval (0; ~x) and one on (~x;+1) ; it is necessary to compare the values of
the function at these two extrema to nd its optimal behavior.
Figure 1 presents a simple numerical simulation with two local maxima
for the following values of parameters:  = 0:7;  = 0:9571; R = 1:0375;
 = 0:5; A = 12 and C = 6: Depending on the value of B; the optimal value
of rst period savings x can imply either y = 0 or y > 0: B = 3:28565 is the
threshold value such that the two local maxima are equal.
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3.2 Self 1s objective function
In this part the objective function of self 1 is studied with respect to x; self 1s
decision variable. Two cases are considered: on the interval (~x;+1) ; Y (x)
is positive; on the interval (0; ~x) ; Y (x) cancels out. Finally, the solution of
the game between selves 1 and 2 is found.
3.2.1 Self 1s objective function on (~x;+1)
First the solution is assumed to be such that y > 0; or (B +Rx) (R) > C:
In this case, the value of x chosen by self 1 is again the solution of program
(4). It has been shown that program (4) can lead either to a positive value
of x given by (6), or to x = 0: As C > B (R) ; the solution x = 0
is not compatible with the assumption y > 0; because x = 0 implies y =
0: Therefore, to obtain the case y > 0 as a solution, it is necessary that
RZA > B + C=R; and x is given by (6). Moreover, x being given by (6),
to obtain a positive value for y; the study of self 2s behavior has shown that
it is necessary that x^ > ~x. Using (2) and (6), the inequality x^ > ~x leads to:
A+
B
R
>
C
RZ (R)

1 +R 1Z +R 1 ()
  K (8)
When C > B (R) ; as ~x > 0 the inequality x^ > ~x is stronger than x^ > 0:
Therefore, if (8) is true, the condition RZA > B + C=R holds.
To sum up, if (8) is satised, self 1s objective function has a local maxi-
mum x^ 2 (~x;+1) given by (6), with Y (x^) > 0: If (8) is not satised, self 1s
objective function is decreasing on (~x;+1) ; as the maximum of the objective
function is obtained for a value of x smaller than ~x:
3.2.2 Self 1s objective function on (0; ~x)
The second type of solution is such that y = 0: In this case, self 1s program
is given by:(
max
(x)
1
1 1= (A  x)1 1= + 1 1= (B +Rx)1 1= + 
2
1 1= (C)
1 1=
s. t. x  0
The solution is:
 If (R) A  B
x =
(R) A B
R + (R)
 x (9)
9
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.28
 If (R) A < B; x = 0: The objective function is decreasing on the
interval (0; ~x); as the maximum is reached for a negative value of x:
In the case (R) A  B; the value of x given by (9) is admissible only
if it belongs to (0; ~x) : In the converse case, y should be positive.
Using (9) and (2), the inequality x < ~x leads to
A+
B
R
<
C
(R)2

1 +R 1 ()
  L (10)
To sum up, if (R) A  B and if (10) is satised, self 1s objective
function has a local maximum x 2 (0; ~x) given by (9), with Y (x) = 0: If (10)
is not satised, it means that self 1s objective function is increasing on the
interval (0; ~x); as the maximum is obtained for a value of x greater than ~x:
If (R) A < B; self 1s objective function is decreasing on the interval
(0; ~x):
3.3 The solution of the game between selves 1 and 2
From (8) and (10), it is straightforward to check that K < L as  < 1:
Therefore, the comparison of the two preceding types of solution leads to the
following results.
3.3.1 Solution in the case A+B=R  K
If A + B=R  K; condition (8) is not satised but (10) holds. From the
preceding analysis, it is known that self 1s objective function is decreasing
on the interval (~x;+1) ((8) does not hold). On the interval (0; ~x); as (10)
holds, two cases may happen: If (R) A  B; self 1s objective function
reaches a local maximum in x = x > 0 given by (9). If (R) A < B; self 1s
objective function is decreasing on the interval (0; ~x): From these properties,
the result follows:
Proposition 1 If C > B (R) and A + B=R  K; the solution of the
game between selves 1 and 2 is:
 if (R) A  B; x = x given by (9) and y = 0;
 if (R) A < B; x = 0 and y = 0:
10
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These rst results show that the intertemporal wealth of the consumer
during the two rst periods (A+B=R) plays a crucial role in savings. If this
wealth is low and if C is high enough, self 1 has no interest in saving an
amount x allowing self 2 to save a positive amount y. Expecting y = 0; the
savings choice of self 1 is positive if A is relatively high with respect to B
and zero otherwise.
3.3.2 Solution in the case A+B=R  L
If A+B=R  L; condition (8) holds and condition (10) is not satised:
A+
B
R
 C
(R)2

1 +R 1 ()

By assumption, C > B (R) : These two inequalities imply that (R) A >
B: Therefore it is possible to deduce in this case that:
 on the interval (0; ~x); self 1s objective function is increasing on the
interval (0; ~x):
 on the interval (~x;+1); self 1s objective function has a maximum x^:
Finally, the result is obtained:
Proposition 2 If C > B (R) and A + B=R  L; the solution of the
game between selves 1 and 2 is: x = x^ and y = Y (x^):
In this case, the intertemporal wealth of the consumer during the two
rst periods (A+B=R) is high. The optimal behavior of self 1 is to save an
amount x high enough to allow self 2 to save a positive amount y.
3.3.3 Solution in the case K < A+B=R < L
When A+B=R < L; the preceding study (section 3.2.2) has shown that two
cases may happen, depending on the sign of (R) A B: Therefore, these
two cases are studied separately.
11
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First case: (R) A  B: In this case, previous analysis have shown that
self 1s objective function has two local maxima: on (0; ~x) ; x given by (9)
is a local maximum, and Y (x) = 0; on (~x;+1) ; x^ given by (6) is another
one, with Y (x^) > 0: To know what is the nal choice of self 1, it is necessary
to compare the value of the objective function at these two points x and
x^: When x = x and y = 0; the corresponding values for consumption are
denoted by c; d and e and the utility level of self 1 is U(c; d; e): When x = x^
and y = Y (x^); the corresponding values for consumption are denoted by c^;
d^ and e^ and the utility level of self 1 is U(c^; d^; e^):
Lemma 1  The values of U(c; d; e) and U(c^; d^; e^) are given by
U(c; d; e) =

   1

A+
B
R
1  1
 
1 +R 1 ()
 1
 +

   1
2 (C)1 
1

U(c^; d^; e^) =

   1

A+
B
R
+
C
R2
1  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1

 Let us dene the function F as:
F () =

   1

 +
C
R2
1  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1

  
   1 ()
1  1


1 +R 1 ()
 1
   
   1
2 (C)1 
1

F is dened in such a way that F (A+B=R) = U(c^; d^; e^)   U(c; d; e).
F is strictly increasing on [K;L] ; with F (K) < 0 and F (L) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
This technical lemma allows us to conclude on the optimal behavior of
self 1.
Proposition 3 Assume that C > B (R) ; K < A + B=R < L and
(R) A  B: There exists M 2 (K;L) such that,
 if K < A + B=R < M; the game between selves 1 and 2 leads to the
decisions x = x and y = 0:
 if M < A + B=R < L the game between selves 1 and 2 leads to the
decisions x = x^ and y = Y (x^)
 if A + B=R = M; self 1 is indi¤erent between the two solutions x =
x and y = 0; or x = x^ and y = Y (x^):
12
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Following propositions (1) and (2), this proposition shows that for (R) A 
B; the line A + B=R = M is the pertinent frontier that separates the two
types of savings behaviors: x = x^ and y = Y (x^) or x = x and y = 0.
A consequence of this result is that, if A + B=R is close to M; a small
change in one parameter (A; or B or R) can have a dramatic e¤ect on savings
behavior: y can jump from 0 to Y (x^); and x can jump from x to x^: This
point will be developed later in Section 4.
Second case: (R) A < B: In this case, it is not possible to reach the
solution x = x; y = 0 associated with (c; d; e): Therefore, the equilibrium
of the game between selves 1 and 2 is obtained by the comparison between
U(c^; d^; e^) and U(A;B;C): The last value of the utility corresponds to the
solution x = 0 and y = 0:
Before doing this comparison, it is useful to note that the indirect utility
U(c; d; e) =

   1

A+
B
R
1  1
 
1 +R 1 ()
 1
 +

   1
2 (C)1 
1

can also be interpreted as the utility that self 1 could get in the absence
of the constraint x  0 (but with the constraint y  0 which is binding).
Consequently, a rst property is obtained: U(c; d; e) > U(A;B;C): With no
constraint on x; it would be optimal to have a negative amount of savings in
period 1 as (R) A < B:
In the case M  A + B=R < L, it is easy to conclude. Indeed, it is
known that U(c^; d^; e^)  U(c; d; e) and U(c; d; e) > U(A;B;C): Consequently
U(c^; d^; e^) > U(A;B;C): The game between selves 1 and 2 leads to the de-
cisions x = x^ and y = Y (x^). This result is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 If C > B (R) ; (R) A < B and M  A + B=R < L;
the solution of the game between selves 1 and 2 is: x = x^ and y = Y (x^):
The case K < A + B=R < M needs a particular study as U(c^; d^; e^) <
U(c; d; e) and U(c; d; e) > U(A;B;C): Thus, it remains to compare U(c^; d^; e^)
with U(A;B;C):
The following proposition gives the results:
Proposition 5 Assume that C > B (R) ; (R) A < B and K < A +
B=R < M: There exists a decreasing function (A) dened on [AH ; AI ] ;
13
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with
AH =
C
(RZ) (R)

1 +R 1 ()

; (AH) =
C
(R)
AI =
M
1 +R 1 ()
; (AI) =
M (R)
1 +R 1 ()
such that,
 if B < (A); U(c^; d^; e^) < U(A;B;C) : the game between selves 1 and
2 leads to the decisions x = 0 and y = 0.
 if B > (A); U(c^; d^; e^) > U(A;B;C) : the game between selves 1 and
2 leads to the decisions x = x^ and y = Y (x^).
 if B = (A); U(c^; d^; e^) = U(A;B;C) : self 1 is indi¤erent between
these two solutions.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
Propositions (4) and (5) allow us to conclude when K < A + B=R < L;
C > B (R) and (R) A < B: When the intertemporal wealth of the
consumer during the two rst periods is high enough (A + B=R  M) ,
the optimal choice for self 1 is x = x^ (and y = Y (x^) for self 2). When
A + B=R < M; the choice of self 1 remains x = x^ only if B is high enough
with respect to A (B > (A)). In the converse case, self 1 chooses x = 0 and
self 2 y = 0.
4 Final results and consequences
4.1 An overall picture of the consumers choice
For a given value of the third period income C; it is possible to obtain an
overall characterization of the consumers savings choices, using the preceding
results. Four cases may arise, depending on A and B that allow us to dene
four sets:
Z1 = f(A;B) s. t. (R) A > B and A+B=R < Mg
Z2 =

(A;B) s. t. (R) A < B; B < C (R)  ,
A+B=R < M and B < (A) for A 2 (AH ; AI)g
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Z3 = f(A;B) s. t. A > AH ; (RZ) A > B + C=R; B > (A) for A 2 (AH ; AI) ,
A+B=R > M for A > AIg
Z4 =

(A;B) s. t. B > C (R)  and (RZ) A > B + C=R
	
The preceding results give the consumers choice in each set2:
 Set 1: x = x given by (9) and y = 0:
 Set 2: x = 0 and y = 0:
 Set 3: x = x^ given by (6) and y = Y (x^) given by (3).
 Set 4: x = 0 and y = Y (0) given by (3).
Figure (2) represents the characterization of the di¤erent zones of the
plane (A;B) corresponding to the four sets. The main frontiers are in bold
lines. The gure is obtained for the following values of the parameters:
 = 0:7;  = 0:9571; R = 1:0375; C = 6 and  = 2: The three rst parameters
are chosen according to the benchmark calibration of Harris and Laibson
(2002). The value of  is set equal to 2 in order to make more apparent the
curve (A): The numerical values have no incidence on the general form of
the gure. In the next part, gures associated with  = 0:5 and  = 0:99
will be provided.
4.2 Some consequences of quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing
The assumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounting can have strong consequences
on savings behaviors, when self 1s objective function is not concave. Di¤er-
ent illustrations are provided, with di¤erent parameters values.
Initially, the benchmark calibration of Harris and Laibson (2002) is used:
 = 0:7;  = 0:9571; R = 1:0375;  = 0:5: The value of C is xed to
C = 6: Figure (3) presents the di¤erent zones for these parameter values.
The impact of A and B on the amount of savings x is studied. In Figure
2To simplify the exposition, the frontiers have not been included in the 4 sets. Indeed,
for some frontiers corresponding to a discontinuity in the optimal strategy, two di¤er-
ent choices are equivalent for self 1, as it was established in the preceding results (see
propositions (3) and (5)).
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.28
(4), x is represented as a function of B for two di¤erent values of A : A = 12
and A = 8:163. With A = 12; starting from B = 0 and increasing B; the
incomes of the consumer rst belong to zone 1, and successively reach zone 3
and 4 (cf. Figure (3)). When B reaches the value such that M = A+B=R;
x jumps from x = x to x = x^ > x: The slope of the savings function goes
from  0:53 to  0:37.
With A = 8:16; as B increases, the incomes of the consumer belong to
zone 1 at the beginning, and successively reach zone 2, 3 and 4 (cf. Figure
(3)). In zone 1; x = x and decreases with B till 0: In zone 2; x remains equal
to 0:When crossing the frontier (A); x jumps from 0 to a positive value x^.
In zone 3; x = x^ and decreases with B till 0: In zone 4; x remains equal to 0:
The e¤ect of A on savings for a given value of B is simulated for B = 4
(cf. Figure (5)). Starting from A = 0 and increasing A; consumer incomes
successively cross zones 2, 1 and 3 (cf. Figure (3)). In zone 2, x = 0: In
zone 1, x = x and increases with A: When A reaches the value such that
M = A + B=R; x jumps from x = x to x = x^ > x: The slope of the savings
function goes from 0:44 to 0:61.
The same numerical simulations are done for  = 0:99: The overall picture
of frontiers is given in Figure (6). The impact of A and B on the amount
of savings x is studied. In Figure (7), x is represented as a function of B
for two di¤erent values of A : A = 16 and A = 11:13: The values of A are
changed with respect to the preceding simulations, in order to obtain the
same qualitative features, as the frontiers have moved. Figure (8) shows the
evolution of x with respect to A when B is xed to B = 4: The comparison
with the case  = 0:5 shows that increasing the elasticity of substitution
allows us to obtain more dramatic jumps in savings functions. The same
increase in the jumps could be obtained through a decrease of :
In these simple examples, the evolution of savings x with respect to A and
B has been considered. It is possible to make the same study with the other
parameters. For instance, a jump of savings can also be obtained through a
change in the interest factor R:
Our numerical simulations show that savings functions under quasi hy-
perbolic discounting present signicative di¤erences with respect to the stan-
dard case, when discontinuous strategies are taken into account, even for the
benchmark parametrization of Harris and Laibson. Firstly, savings functions
may undergo upward jumps, resulting from an increase in incomes. Secondly,
after these jumps, the slope of savings with respect to income may go up or
down.
3The value 8:16 corresponds to (AH +AI)=2:
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These theoretical results may have important consequences for the empir-
ical analysis of savings. If agents behave as predicted by the theory, savings
functions should be estimated through functional forms able to deal with
these jumps and changes in slopes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a simple life-cycle consumption model with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting and imperfect capital markets has been studied. Using three
periods of life for the consumer, it has been possible to reach a complete
resolution and a characterization of savings behavior. It has been shown
that the savings function may experience discontinuities when consumer in-
comes reach some threshold values. These discontinuities may arise even for
"reasonable" values of the parameters. They show that quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting can lead to important di¤erences in agentsbehaviors, compared
with the standard assumption of exponential discounting.
This paper could be extended in di¤erent directions. Firstly, a technical
improvement could be made by introducing more than three periods and
more than two decisions. Secondly, discontinuous strategies could be studied
in more complex nancial environment. For example, in an economy with one
liquid and one illiquid asset, as in Laibson (1997), discontinuous strategies
could exist as a consequence of the non-borrowing constraint on the two
assets. Thirdly, discontinuous strategies could exist in other frameworks. For
example, Wigniolle (2011) shows that discontinuous strategies can exist in the
standard quantity-quality trade-o¤ model of fertility with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. In the problem of the decision of retirement that is analyzed
by Diamond and Koszegi (2003), discontinuous strategies could also play a
role. In their article, they introduce at some period the retirement decision
as a discrete variable. If the time spent working in this period and the
retirement time were continuous variables, the existence of discontinuous
strategies would become apparent.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of lemma (1).
The rst part of lemma (1) is a straightforward calculation.
The second part is concerned with the study of the function F () =
U(c^; d^; e^)  U(c; d; e) with  = A+B=R:
17
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Firstly it is proved that F (K) < 0: The case  = K corresponds to the
limit case x^ = ~x when self 1s objective function is studied on (~x;+1) : From
Section 3.1, it is known that the derivative of self 1s objective function is
discontinuous at the point ~x; with a higher value to the right of ~x: When
x^ = ~x the value of the derivative on the right is 0: Therefore, the value of
the derivative on the left is negative. This proves that U(c^; d^; e^) < U(c; d; e)
or F (K) < 0:
Secondly it is proved that F (L) > 0: The case  = L corresponds to the
limit case x = ~x when self 1s objective function is studied on (0; ~x) : From
Section 3.1, it is known that the derivative of self 1s objective function is
discontinuous at the point ~x; with a higher value to the right of ~x: When
x = ~x the value of the derivative on the left is 0: Therefore, the value of the
derivative on the right is positive. This proves that U(c^; d^; e^) > U(c; d; e) or
F (L) > 0:
Finally, it remains to show that F 0() > 0: The derivative is:
F 0() =

 +
C
R2
  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1
   ()  1 1 +R 1 () 1
The condition F 0() > 0; after some calculations, can be expressed:
 > C
1 +R 1 ()
R 1 [Z   ()] (11)
where it is important to note that Z   () > 0: Indeed, from (5), the
condition Z > () is equivalent to:
#() 

1 +  (R) 1

[1 +R 1 ()] 1
> 1
For  = 1; #(1) = 1 + R 1 > 1: The derivative is
d ln [#()]
d
=
(   1)R 1 2(1  ) 
1 +  1R 1

(1 + R 1)
For  < 1; #() is a decreasing function of  when  < 1 with #(1) > 1:
Therefore, #() > 1:
For  > 1; #() is an increasing function of  when  < 1 with #(0) = 1:
Therefore, #() > 1: Finally, in any case, #() > 1 and Z   () > 0:
Coming back to condition (11), it remains to prove that this condition
holds when K <  < M: A su¢ cient condition for that is:
K =
C
RZ (R)

1 +R 1Z +R 1 ()

> C
1 +R 1 ()
R 1 [Z   ()]
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After some calculations, taking into account the expression of Z given by (5),
this inequality is equivalent to  < 1 which is true by assumption.
6.2 Proof of proposition (5).
The proof is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Assume that C > B (R) ; (R) A < B and K < A+B=R <
M: Let us consider a given value of C and a given value of  = A + B=R
with K <  < M: A and B may vary in such a way that  = A + B=R;
with a higher bound Ah() for A such that Ah() = = [1 +R 1 ()] and
a lower bound Al() for A such that Al() =  C= [R (R)] : There exists
an increasing function () that satises Al() < () < Ah() and such that
 for Al() < A < (); U(c^; d^; e^) > U(A;B;C) : the game between selves
1 and 2 leads to the decisions x = x^ and y = Y (x^).
 for () < A < Ah(); U(c^; d^; e^) < U(A;B;C) : the game between
selves 1 and 2 leads to the decisions x = 0 and y = 0.
 for A = (); self 1 is indi¤erent between these two solutions.
The function () is implicitly dened by:
u() + u [R (   )] + 2u(C) = U(c^; d^; e^)
Proof:
Let us consider a given value of C and a given value of  = A+B=R with
K   < M: U(c^; d^; e^) and U(c; d; e) only depend on  and C and they are
xed. For this given value of , it is possible to consider di¤erent values for
A and B such that  = A + B=R: The highest possible value of A is such
that (R) A = B; and it corresponds to the lowest possible value for B:
This gives the values
Ah() =

1 +R 1 ()
Bl() =
(R) 
1 +R 1 ()
For A = Ah() and B = Bl(); U(c; d; e) = U(A;B;C): Indeed the optimal
choice of x without any constraint for x (and y = 0) is such that x = 0: As
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U(c^; d^; e^) < U(c; d; e) (and  < M), it is clear that U(c^; d^; e^) < U(A;B;C):
The game between selves 1 and 2 leads to the decisions x = 0 and y = 0:
The highest possible value of B is such that C = B (R) ; and it cor-
responds to the lowest value of A: This gives the values
Al() =    C
R (R)
Bh() =
C
(R)
For B such that C = B (R) ; ~x = 0: The objective function of self one
is concave on (0;+1) : The optimal choice of x again is given by (6). It is
positive as
RZA B   C
R
> 0
Indeed, for A = Al() and B = Bh(); this inequality becomes:
 >
C
RZ (R)

1 +R 1Z +R 1 ()

= K
which is true as  > K by assumption. Therefore, in this case, U(c^; d^; e^)
corresponds to the optimal choice of self 1 and U(c^; d^; e^) > U(A;B;C):
Finally, the expression of U(A;B;C) is studied as a function of A and  :
G(A; )  u(A) + u [R (   A)] + 2u(C)
The derivative @G(A; )=@x is positive as it leads to
A 
1
  RB  1 > 0, (R) A < B
G(A; ) is an increasing function of A: G is such that G(Al(); )) < U(c^; d^; e^)
and G(Ah(); ) > U(c^; d^; e^): Therefore, the existence and uniqueness of ()
is proved and
 for Al() < A < (); U(c^; d^; e^) > U(A;B;C) : the game between
selves 1 and 2 leads to the decisions x = x^ and y = Y (x^).
 for () < A < Ah(); U(c^; d^; e^) < U(A;B;C) : the game between
selves 1 and 2 leads to the decisions x = 0 and y = 0.
 for A = (); U(c^; d^; e^) = U(A;B;C):
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It remains to prove that () is an increasing function. The function ()
is implicitly dened by: U(A;R (   ) ; C) = U(c^; d^; e^); or

   1
h
()1 
1
 + (R (   ))1  1 + (C)1  1
i
=

   1

 +
C
R2
1  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1

The derivative 0() is such that:
h
A 
1
  RB  1
i
0() =

 +
C
R2
  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1
  RB  1
The term A 
1
   RB  1 is positive as by assumption (R) A < B: It
remains to prove that the right-hand side is positive. To prove that, it is rst
proved that 
 +
C
R2
  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1
 > A 
1

this inequality is equivalent to
A

1 +R 1Z

> A+
B
R
+
C
R2
(12)
which gives AR 1Z > B + C=R: This last inequality is true. Indeed, the
inequality K < A+B=R leads to
A+
B
R
>
C
RZ (R)

1 +R 1Z +R 1 ()

or
ARZ >  BR
Z
R
+
C
R
+
C
(R)

1 +R 1Z

By assumption, C > B (R) ; which allows us to write:
ARZ >  BR
Z
R
+
C
R
+B

1 +R 1Z

that gives AR 1Z > B + C=R: Finally, it has been proved that
 +
C
R2
  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1
 > A 
1

As it is assumed that A 
1
 > RB 
1
 ; it implies that
 +
C
R2
  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1
 > RB 
1
 (13)
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Finally,  is an increasing function of  :
Proof of proposition (5).
From the relation A = (); it is possible to nd a relation between A
and B given by: B = R [ 1(A)  A]  (A): It is easy to show that (A)
is a decreasing function. Indeed, (A) is implicitly dened by U(A;B;C) =
U(c^; d^; e^); or

   1
h
(A)1 
1
 + (B)1 
1
 + (C)1 
1

i
=

   1

A+
B
R
+
C
R2
1  1
 
1 +R 1Z
 1

(14)
The derivative 0(A) is such that:"
RB 
1
  

A+
B
R
+
C
R2
  1
  
1 +R 1Z
 1

#
0(A)
R
=

A+
B
R
+
C
R2
  1
  
1 +R 1Z
 1
   A  1
From the preceding results (cf. (12) and (13)), it is known that
A+
B
R
+
C
R2
  1
  
1 +R 1Z
 1
   A  1 > 0
RB 
1
  

A+
B
R
+
C
R2
  1
  
1 +R 1Z
 1
 < 0
Therefore 0(A) < 0:
From (14), it is easy to check that
(AH) = 

C
(RZ) (R)

1 +R 1 ()

=
C
(R)
(AI) = 

M
1 +R 1 ()

=
M (R)
1 +R 1 ()

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Figure 1: self 1's objective function for A = 6, β = 0.7, 
δ = 0.9571, R = 1.0375, C = 6, σ = 0.5.
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Figure 2: characterization of results with respect to A and B
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Figure 3: the different zones with σ = 0.5
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Figure 4: savings x with respect to B
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Figure 5: savings x with respect to A
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Figure 6: the different zones with σ = 0.99
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Figure 7: savings x with respect to B
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Figure 8: savings x with respect to A
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